Despite the adoption of the 11 May agenda, the discussion on procedural issues was prevented from addressing the substantive issues of the treaty. States Parties did not agree on the issues considered by the major committees and on those that should be considered by subsidiary bodies. There were particular differences of opinion regarding a subsidiary body on negative security guarantees, with THE NAM insisting on a separate subsidiary to discuss this issue, while an NWS was to give such a priority to the subject. As the debate on advisory bodies continued, the President gave delegations time to present their working papers during the plenary session. These meetings were then used to present proposals until agreement was reached on 18 May on the time that should be allocated to the large committees and subsidiary bodies. Finally, three subsidiary bodies were established to examine nuclear disarmament and security guarantees, regional issues and the Middle East, as well as the withdrawal from the treaty. It was also decided that The Grand Commission I would look at disarmament and non-proliferation education and consider proposals to strengthen the review process. The treaty, which was signed in 1968, came into force in 1970. As requested by the text, the contracting parties to the NPT met in May 1995 after 25 years and agreed to renew the contract indefinitely.  More countries are parties to the non-proliferation treaty than any other arms control and disarmament treaty, demonstrating the importance of the treaty.  Since August 2016, 191 states have become parties to the treaty, although North Korea, which joined in 1985 but never agreed, announced its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 after blowing up nuclear facilities in violation of its commitments.  Four UN member states have never accepted the non-proliferation and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, three of which possess nuclear weapons or are presumed to possess nuclear weapons: India, Israel and Pakistan.
In addition, South Sudan, founded in 2011, has not joined. The JCPoA is a robust non-proliferation agreement and an asset for international peace and security, which should prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. This agreement shows that non-proliferation efforts, combined with all diplomatic, economic and anti-proliferation instruments, are effective if maintained over time. After about two years of EU3 diplomatic efforts and the temporary suspension of Iran`s enrichment programme, the IAEA Board of Governors found, in accordance with Article XII.C of the IAEA statute, in a rare non-compliance decision, with 12 abstentions, that these breaches constituted a breach of the IAEA safeguard agreement.  This was reported to the UN Security Council in 2006, after which the Security Council adopted a resolution calling on Iran to suspend its enrichment.  Instead, Iran resumed its enrichment program.  Until 2010, China reportedly signed a civil nuclear agreement with Pakistan on the grounds that the agreement was “peaceful”.  The British government criticized him on the grounds that “the time has not yet come for a civil nuclear agreement with Pakistan.”  China did not obtain formal authorization from the nuclear supplier group and instead asserted that its cooperation with Pakistan was “grandpa” when China joined the NSG, an allegation disputed by other NSG members.  Pakistan applied for membership on 19 May 2016, supported by Turkey and China However, many NSG members rejected Pakistan`s application for membership because of its record, including the illegal buying network of Pakistani scientist A.Q.